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Abstract: 
This paper has two overarching goals – to summarize recent developments on the 
philosophical and practical dimensions of process tracing, and to identify features 
common to best practices of it on different kinds of arguments, with different kinds of 
available evidence, in different substantive research domains. First, we define process 
tracing and discuss its foundations in the philosophy of social science. Next, we 
address its techniques and evidentiary sources, and advance ten criteria for judging its 
quality in particular pieces of research. Finally, we analyze the methodological issues 
specific to process tracing on general categories of theories, including structural-
institutional, cognitive-psychological, and sociological. (NB: this paper is 
forthcoming as Chapter 1 in A. Bennett and J.T. Checkel, eds., Process Tracing in 
the Social Sciences: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool.) 
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Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices 
I. Introduction 
Why did the Cold War end peacefully, without a shot being fired? In the post-Cold War 
world, civil conflicts have replaced interstate war as the dominant form of organized political 
violence, with rebel groups – instead of ICBMs – as a key focus of both policy and scholarship. 
Yet what makes such groups tick? Why do some engage in wanton killing and sexual violence 
while others do not? The European Union is a unique experiment in governance ‘beyond the 
nation state,’ but how are its supra-national governance structures being crafted and with what 
effect on the ordinary citizens of Europe?  
Contemporary political scientists and sociologists have converged on the view that these 
puzzles, and many more on the current scholarly and policy agendas, demand answers that 
combine social and institutional structure and context with individual agency and decision-
making. This view, together with recent developments in the philosophy of science, has led to an 
increasing emphasis on causal explanation via reference to hypothesized causal mechanisms. Yet 
this development begs the questions of how to define such mechanisms, how to measure them in 
action, and how to test competing explanations that invoke different mechanisms.  
This book argues that techniques falling under the label of “process tracing” are 
particularly well-suited for measuring and testing hypothesized causal mechanisms. 
Indeed, a large and growing number of political scientists now invoke the term. Despite 
or perhaps because of this fact, a buzzword problem has arisen, where process tracing is 
mentioned, but often with little thought or explication of how it works in practice. As one sharp 
observer has noted, proponents of qualitative methods draw upon various debates – over 
mechanisms and causation, say – to argue that process tracing is necessary and good. Yet, they 
have done much less work to articulate the criteria for determining whether a particular piece of 
research counts as good process tracing (Waldner, nd: 2–3). Put differently, “there is substantial 
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distance between the broad claim that ‘process tracing is good’ and the precise claim ‘this is an 
instance of good process tracing’” (Waldner, 2011: 7). 
This volume addresses such concerns, and does so along several dimensions. Meta-
theoretically, it establishes a philosophical basis for process tracing – one that captures 
mainstream uses while simultaneously being open to applications by interpretive scholars. 
Conceptually, contributors explore the relation of process tracing to mechanism-based 
understandings of causation. Most important, we develop evaluative standards for individual 
process-tracing accounts – for example, criteria for how micro to go and how to deal with the 
problem of equifinality (the possibility that there may be multiple paths or combinations of 
different variables that can produce the same kind of outcome). 
Ours is an applied methods book – and not a standard methodology text – where the aim 
is to show how process tracing works in practice. If Van Evera (1997), George and Bennett 
(2005) and Gerring (2007a) set the state of the art for case studies, then our volume is a logical 
follow-on, establishing clear standards for what is perhaps the central within case method – 
process tracing. 
Despite all the recent attention, process tracing – or the use of evidence from within a 
historical case to make inferences about causal explanations of that case – has in fact been 
around for thousands of years. Related forms of historical analysis date back to the Greek 
historian Thucydides and perhaps even to the origins of human language and society. It is nearly 
impossible to avoid historical explanations and causal inferences from historical cases in any 
purposive human discourse or activity. 
Although social science methodologists have debated and detailed formal approaches to 
inference such as statistical analysis for over a hundred years, they have only recently coined the 
term ‘process tracing’ or attempted to explicate its procedures in a systematic way. Perhaps this 
is because drawing causal inferences from historical cases is a more intuitive practice than 
statistical analysis and one that individuals carry out in their everyday lives. Yet, the seemingly 
intuitive nature of process tracing obscures that its unsystematic use is fraught with potential 
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inferential errors; it is thus important to utilize rigorous methodological safeguards to reduce 
such risks.  
The goal of this book is therefore to explain the philosophical foundations, specific 
techniques, common evidentiary sources, and standards and best practices of process tracing in 
order to reduce the risks of making inferential errors in the analysis of historical cases. This 
introductory chapter first defines process tracing and discusses its foundations in the philosophy 
of social science. We then address its techniques and evidentiary sources, and advance ten 
criteria for judging the quality of process tracing in empirical research. The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of the methodological issues specific to process tracing on general categories of 
theories, including structural-institutional, cognitive-psychological, and sociological. Subsequent 
chapters take up this last issue in greater detail and assess the contributions of process tracing in 
particular research programs or bodies of theory. 
II. Defining Process Tracing 
The term process tracing originated in the field of cognitive psychology in the United 
States in the late 1960s or early 1970s.
1
 As used in psychology, process tracing refers to 
techniques for examining the intermediate steps in cognitive mental processes to better 
understand the heuristics through which humans make decisions. In 1979, the Stanford 
University political scientist Alexander L. George appropriated the term process tracing to 
describe the use of evidence from within case studies to make inferences about historical 
explanations (George, 1979). 
Because much of George’s own research was in political psychology, and because the 
term process tracing originated in cognitive psychology, process tracing has sometimes been 
viewed as applying mostly or only to analyses of individual level decision making. Although 
process tracing does apply well to individual level and cognitive theories (see Jacobs, this 
volume), George made clear in subsequent writings that it can also be used to make inferences 
on structural or macro-level explanations of historical cases (George and Bennett, 2005: 142, 
                                                          
1
 The very first usage of the term remains unclear; the earliest relevant citation on Google Scholar is Hobarth, 1972, 
a PhD thesis at the University of Chicago. 
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214; see also Waldner, this volume). For example, many economic theories hypothesize 
relationships and sequences among macroeconomic variables that can be tested through process 
tracing at the macro level as well as that at the micro or individual level. 
Similarly, because of its origins in cognitive psychology and because many of its early 
practitioners in that field went on to explore the errors that individuals make and the biases they 
exhibit in their decision making, process tracing is sometimes viewed as incompatible with 
rational choice theories. We concur, however, with the many prominent rational choice theorists 
who argue that their hypotheses should bear some correspondence with the actual processes 
through which individuals make decisions, and that they should therefore be amenable to process 
tracing (Bates, Weingast, Grief, Levi, and Rosenthal, 1998; see also Schimmelfennig, this 
volume).  
The essential meaning that the term process tracing has retained from its origins in 
cognitive psychology is that it refers to the examination of intermediate steps in a process to 
make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it 
generated the outcome of interest. In previous work together with George (George and Bennett, 
2005: 6), one of us defined process tracing as the use of “histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies 
in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.” 
We added that “the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – 
the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the 
outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005: 206). 
The authors then used a metaphor to expand on this definition. If one had a row of fifty 
dominoes lying on the table after they had previously been standing, how could one make 
inferences about whether the first domino caused the last to fall through a ‘domino process,’ or 
whether wind, a bump of the table, or some other force caused the dominoes to fall? The answer, 
George and Bennett argued, was to use evidence on the intervening processes posited by each of 
the alternative explanations. Did anyone hear a succession of dominoes? Do the positions of the 
fallen dominoes shed light on how they fell? And so on.  
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While we feel this definition is still an excellent starting point, it is necessary to point out 
a weakness in both it and the accompanying metaphor. The term intervening variable opens the 
door for potential confusion because social scientists are accustomed to thinking of variables as 
either causal (independent) or caused (dependent). However, both the term and the metaphor of 
dominoes falling suggest that an intervening variable is both fully caused by the independent 
variable(s) that preceded it, and that it transmits this causal force, without adding to it, 
subtracting from it, or altering it, to subsequent intervening variables and ultimately through 
them to the dependent variable. 
The observable events that intercede between hypothesized causes and observed effects 
could indeed have this character, but they might instead be caused by forces in addition to those 
of the specified independent variables, and they may have amplifying or dampening effects of 
their own, or interactions or feedback effects. In the domino metaphor, the dominoes could be 
falling in sequence with increasing or decreasing force depending on the spacing between them, 
and the table could also be shaking and the wind blowing at the same time that the dominoes are 
striking one another, each with some effects on the falling dominoes.  
In such instances, researchers have to make theory-building choices. Are they going to 
model additional variables that play a role in the process as exogenous, complementary, or 
endogenous? Exogenous variables are those excluded from the model because they are either not 
powerful enough to worry about or too complex to be theorized. Complementary variables are 
those that add to or subtract from the effects of the main variables of interest but do so 
independently, or without interaction effects related to the main variables. When such variables 
are sufficiently simple to be theorized about, they can be added to a model without changing the 
main variables or mechanisms of interest. Additional variables that interact with the independent 
variables of interest in more complex ways need to be either brought into the model 
(endogenized) or identified but set aside from the model (exogenized). Methodologically, 
whatever way additional variables are brought into or set aside from the theory that aims to 
explain the case, this modification can be tested through additional process tracing. 
Alternatively, and perhaps ideally, some process tracing observations are based on 
diagnostic evidence on events, or evidence that indicates the kind of process taking place but 
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does not transmit any effects to the dependent variable. This is analogous to a diagnostic medical 
test, such as a dye injected into a patient to enhance a CAT scan of blood flow in a damaged 
heart. The dye does not transmit any effects to the heart, but it provides evidence on the 
processes that damaged the heart. Similarly, in social and political life, the ways in which actors 
privately frame or explain their actions, and the actions that they refrain from, may provide 
diagnostic evidence on their motives without directly and publicly affecting the outcomes of 
interest.  
We thus drop the term intervening variable and define process tracing as the analysis of 
evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of 
either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the 
case. Put another way, process tracing examines the deductive observable implications of 
hypothesized causal mechanisms within a case to test whether these might in fact explain the 
case (Schimmelfennig, this volume, emphasizes such a procedure). Or, it inductively uses 
evidence from within a case to develop hypotheses that might explain the case; the latter 
hypotheses may, in turn, generate additional testable implications in the case or in other cases 
(Petersen, this volume, gives examples of the inductive use of process tracing to develop 
theories). 
This definition encompasses the inductive (theory development) and deductive (theory 
testing) sides of process tracing, and it eschews the ambiguous term intervening variable. It also 
reminds us that the causal relations among the events within the case, and between these events 
and the specified independent and dependent variables, may involve amplifying effects, 
dampening effects, feedback effects, and diagnostic connections. Nonetheless, this definition 
aspires to causal inference. 
It is important as well to define “case,” “within a case” and “within case analysis” as we 
use them. Following George and Bennett, we define a case as “an instance of a class of events” 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 17). This definition recognizes that classes of events – revolutions, 
democracies, capitalist economies, wars, and so on – are the social constructions of both political 
actors and the social scientists who study and define political categories. They are not simply 
given to us by history, but defined by our concepts, and much contestation in interpreting the 
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results of case study research concerns disagreements over which cases should or should not be 
included in a defined population.  
We define within-case evidence as evidence from within the temporal, spatial, or topical 
domain defined as a case. This can include a great deal of evidence on contextual or background 
factors that influence how we measure and interpret the variables within a case. Henry Brady and 
David Collier provide a useful distinction here between data set observations and causal process 
observations. Data set observations are “an array of scores on specific variables for a designated 
sample of cases,” and these observations provide the basis for statistical analyses. Causal process 
observations are “observations on context, process, or mechanism” and are used in within-case 
analyses such as process tracing (Brady and Collier, 2010: 12). 
Process tracing is closely related to historical explanation, as that term is used by the 
historian Clayton Roberts. In Roberts’s view, an historical explanation is not simply a detailed 
description of a sequence of events; rather, it draws on theories to explain each important step 
that contributes to causing the outcome. Roberts distinguishes here between macro-correlation 
and micro-correlation, the latter of which is quite similar to process tracing. Macro-correlation 
involves an attempt to explain historical cases at a high level of generality through universalistic 
theories, similar to Hempel’s notion of theories as covering laws. Roberts argues that historical 
events are too complex to fit easily under exception-less covering laws, and efforts to explain 
history via covering laws “have met with little success” (Roberts, 1996:15). He urges instead that 
researchers should use micro-correlation, which involves “the minute tracing of the explanatory 
narrative to the point where the events to be explained are microscopic and the covering laws 
correspondingly more certain” (Roberts, 1996: 66). 
One difference between Roberts’s approach to process tracing and our own is that 
Roberts felt that – at the micro-correlational level – the theories underlying an historical 
explanation would be “platitudinous,” and he noted that historians rarely referenced them 
explicitly because to do so would “hopelessly clog the narrative” (Roberts, 1996: 66–67, 87–88). 
We emphasize instead the importance of making explicit the hypotheses about underlying causal 
mechanisms that are theorized to have caused an historical outcome so that these can be 
rigorously assessed, even at the expense of political science narratives that are more clogged 
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(and alas, less likely to become best-sellers) than those of historians (see also Evangelista, this 
volume, for analysis of works that focus their process tracing as much on explaining an 
important historical case – the end of the Cold War – as on developing and testing general 
theories). 
Our concept of process tracing differs even more sharply with time series cross sectional 
analysis, which involves the correlational study of data across a variety of units (often, annual 
data across a range of countries). Although this form of analysis might be confused with process 
tracing because it involves temporal data from within cases over time, it is still a form of cross-
case and correlational inference, rather than the study of hypothesized processes within 
individual cases, and it is thus fundamentally different from process tracing. 
In sum, process tracing is a key technique for capturing causal mechanisms in action. It is 
not simply glorified historiography, nor does it proceed by the logic of frequentist statistics. And 
– as we argue below – there are metrics and standards available that allow one to distinguish 
good process tracing from bad. However, since standards in some important sense flow from 
underlying philosophical positions, it is important first to clarify the meta-theory of process 
tracing. 
III. Philosophy of Social Science and Process Tracing 
On a philosophical and epistemological level, process tracing is closely related to the turn 
toward social science explanations based on reference to causal mechanisms (Elster, 1998; 
Gerring, 2007b; Mayntz, 2004), or the underlying entities that generate observed processes and 
outcomes. Much of the thinking about causality and causal explanation over the last two hundred 
years has been strongly influenced by David Hume’s argument that constant conjunction – the 
frequent conjoint occurrence of variables A and B – is the essence of causal inference. However, 
more recent work by pragmatist (Johnson, 2006) and scientific realist (Wight, 2006) 
philosophers of science provides a meta-theoretical foundation more amenable to thinking in 
terms of mechanisms. Indeed, for these scholars, a causal explanation is built around contiguity 
and sequencing – concepts that Hume mentioned but gave insufficient attention. These concepts 
open a methodological space for process tracing. 
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One difficulty in making use of contemporary discussions in the philosophy of science is 
that there are at least a half-dozen variants of scientific realism (Chernoff, 2002) and even more 
different definitions of causal mechanisms (Mahoney, 2001; see also Hedstroem and Ylikoski, 
2010). While a full discussion of scientific realism is beyond our present purposes, we concur 
with the emphasis it places on causal processes and causal mechanisms as central elements of 
causal explanation.  
More important for this volume is the task of sorting out the competing definitions of 
causal mechanisms. These divide along three fundamental issues. 1) Are causal mechanisms in 
some sense unobservable? 2) Does explanation via reference to causal mechanisms involve a 
commitment to methodological individualism, or beyond that, to explaining human behavior by 
neuroscience and ultimately by sub-atomic physics? 3) Are causal mechanisms sufficient to 
explain outcomes in specified circumstances or contexts, or might mechanisms be inherently 
probabilistic or stochastic? A brief discussion of these controversies sets the stage for own 
definition of causal mechanisms.
2
  
On the first issue, most discussions of mechanisms place them on the ontological level. 
This means we make hypotheses about how such ontological entities as mechanisms might work, 
and we test the observable implications of these hypotheses, but we do not have unmediated 
access to and are not able to directly observe causal mechanisms. Some proponents of 
mechanisms take a different view, arguing that they are at least somewhat observable. 
Hedstroem and Ylikoski, for example, critique Mahoney for the view that mechanisms are 
unobservable, and draw an analogy to our ability to observe the inner workings of an auto engine 
(Hedstroem and Ylikoski, 2010: 50–51; Mahoney, 2001). 
Such critiques, however, miss the more fundamental point that causal mechanisms are in 
some sense ultimately unobservable. We do not get to observe causality – we make inferences 
about it. Moreover, we cannot unproblematically observe many mechanisms at lower levels of 
analysis – brain waves, neurons, atoms, etc. Rather, we rely on potentially fallible instruments of 
observation (brain scans, microscopes) and theories about how they work. We may be able to 
                                                          
2
 We do not address a fourth issue – the difference between causal mechanisms and theories or hypotheses – as this 
has been treated elsewhere. Hedstroem and Ylikoski, 2010: 54-55, for example. 
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push back the borders of the unobservable world by developing instruments of observation in 
which we have great confidence, but there will always be some still finer level of detail that we 
cannot observe. 
The boundary between the observable and unobservable worlds is like the horizon. We 
can push this border back as our instruments of observation improve, but it also recedes as we 
move toward it, and some part of the universe always remains beyond the horizon and 
unobservable. In the social world, even if brain scans are beginning to reveal some of the inner 
workings of the brain, we do not have these in real time for actual social actors in real world 
settings, we cannot scan brain activity from the past, and there will still be additional micro-level 
brain processes that we cannot observe. 
This raises the second issue concerning methodological individualism and the degree to 
which mechanism-based explanations have to go to minute levels of detail, tiny increments of 
time, and temporally distant causes of events. In our view, explanations need not always go to 
the individual level of analysis (or beyond); it is possible to do process tracing on hypothesized 
causal mechanisms at the macro level (for example, Waldner, this volume). In principle, 
mechanism-based explanations have to be consistent with the finest level of detail we observe; 
however, in practice, this does not mean we must always go to this level to have confidence that 
one explanation is more likely to be true than the alternatives. Many macroeconomic theories 
posit processes involving several temporal steps that can be tested empirically at the macro level. 
The controversy surrounding this issue has led some critics to argue that explanations 
built on causal mechanisms – and, thus, process tracing – involve a potentially infinite regress to 
look at steps between steps in a hypothesized process at ever smaller increments of time and 
more detailed levels of analysis (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994: 85–87). It is true that a 
commitment to explanation via mechanisms means that explanations are always incomplete and 
provisional, and that every explanation can be called into question if it can be shown that its 
hypothesized processes are not evident at a lower level of analysis. It is also true that there is no 
infallible way of deciding how far down, or how far back, to go in explaining an event. However, 
as we argue below, researchers can and do make defensible decisions about when and where to 
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begin and stop in constructing and testing explanations (see also Hedstroem and Ylikoski, 2010: 
52). 
The issue of when to stop is related to the third controversy of whether causal 
mechanisms involve relations of sufficiency or probabilism. Mahoney (2001: 580) defines 
mechanisms as being sufficient in specified circumstances to generate the outcome of interest, 
while Hedstroem and Ylikoski (2010: 51) argue that mechanisms could be inherently stochastic. 
This is a thorny issue, as stochastic relations – like those posited by quantum theory – have some 
aspects of causal explanation but lack others (Salmon, 1990: 120). 
The core problem is that even if the world is deterministic, we observe it as probabilistic 
because of measurement error and specification error, including the omission of important 
variables from our models. We cannot tell with 100% confidence whether we are witnessing a 
probabilistic world or a deterministic one, or whether some processes are deterministic or nearly 
so while others are inherently stochastic. Researchers implicitly make choices on this issue in 
deciding when to stop trying to reduce or explain the “error term,” or unexplained variation. 
In sum, on the key issues in the definitional debates about causal mechanisms we argue 
the following. Causal mechanisms are ontological entities and processes in the world, and 
theories or hypotheses are in our heads; we theorize about mechanisms. Such mechanisms are 
ultimately unobservable, but our hypotheses about them generate observable and testable 
implications. Explanation via reference to causal mechanisms, unlike that via reference to 
covering laws, involves a commitment in principle to being consistent with the lowest level of 
analysis and finest degree of detail observable. We can never know with certainty whether the 
world in general or a particular mechanism that we hypothesize is deterministic or nearly so 
under specified circumstances or whether either is stochastic. We thus define causal mechanisms 
as: 
ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which 
agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to 
transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities. In doing so, the causal agent 
changes the affected entities’ characteristics, capacities, or propensities in ways that 
persist until subsequent causal mechanisms act upon them. If we are able to measure 
changes in the entity being acted upon after the intervention of the causal mechanism and 
in temporal or spatial isolation from other mechanisms, then the causal mechanism may 
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be said to have generated the observed change in the entity (see also George and Bennett, 
2005: 137). 
 
The methodological challenge, then, is to develop theories about causal mechanisms in 
which we can place some confidence and understandings of the scope conditions in which they 
operate. Process tracing is one powerful method for addressing these challenges. Before turning 
to the nuts and bolts of how to do process tracing well, however, three additional foundational 
issues demand attention: the relationship of process tracing to generalization, to interpretive 
social science, and to Bayesian inference. 
 
Generalizability and Process Tracing. Because causal mechanisms are operationalized in 
specific cases, and process tracing is a within-case method of analysis, generalization can be 
problematic. Case study methodologists have argued that a hypothesis is strongly affirmed and 
might be generalizable if it explains a tough test case or a case that, a priori, it looked least likely 
to explain. Conversely, the failure of a hypothesis to explain a most likely case strongly reduces 
our confidence in it. It has always been rather ambiguous, however, whether these inferences 
should apply only to the case being studied, to cases very similar to the one studied, or to a 
broader range of more diverse cases. 
The use of process tracing to test and refine hypotheses about causal mechanisms can 
clarify the scope conditions under which a hypothesis is generalizable. A researcher cannot have 
a very clear idea whether, how, and to which populations an explanation of a case might 
generalize until they have a clear theory about the workings of the mechanisms involved in the 
case. To some degree, this theory can evolve inductively from close study of the case itself. 
Indeed, a theory or explanation derived inductively from a case does not necessarily need 
to be tested against a different case for us to have confidence in the theory; rather, it can be tested 
against different and independent evidence in the case from which it was derived (Mahoney, 
2012: 18). Often, this is a kind of evidence that the researcher had not thought to look for or did 
not recognize as relevant prior to developing the new explanation. Detectives, medical doctors, 
and case study researchers in many sciences and professions frequently make this move. 
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For example, in a study of international socialization in Europe, Checkel and 
collaborators theorized three mechanisms of socialization, two of which were partly derived 
from their own case material. The careful application of process tracing to additional, 
independent evidence from the cases was then used to specify better the scope conditions of each 
mechanism. The result and central finding was that the theory was limited in its application to 
the – albeit crucially important – case of contemporary Europe (Checkel, 2007: chapters 7–8). 
Conversely, a researcher focusing on one or a few cases might uncover a new hypothesis 
that is broadly applicable, as when Charles Darwin’s study of a few species led to his theory of 
evolution. In short, we may uncover hypothesized mechanisms through process tracing that may 
be either very generalizable or unique to one or a few cases, but it is almost impossible to know 
prior to researching a case the degree to which any inductively-derived explanations will be one 
or the other. 
 
Interpretism and Process Tracing. Another important foundational issue is the relation between 
process tracing and interpretism, or more specifically in our own subfield of international 
relations, between process tracing and constructivism. Recall our earlier discussion, where we 
argued that scientific realism provides a possible meta-theoretical basis for process tracing. With 
its stress on cause, objectivity, the consideration of alternative explanations and the like, 
scientific realism is closer to positivism in its various guises than to interpretism (Wight, 2002: 
35–36). What (meta-theoretical) space does this then leave for interpretive process tracing? 
One difficulty here is that scholars have embraced many different kinds of interpretism 
and constructivism.
3
 Most constructivists agree that structures or institutions are social as well as 
material, and that agents and structures are mutually constitutive; however, they differ on 
important epistemological issues (Adler, 2002). One common typology that we find useful 
distinguishes among conventional, interpretive and radical or post-modern views of social life. In 
this schema, conventional constructivists still aspire to causal explanation and believe that there 
are standards for assessing some interpretations of social life to be superior to others. Alexander 
Wendt, a leading constructivist in international relations who has espoused scientific realism and 
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 We will use these terms interchangeably in the following. 
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a role for causal mechanisms, fits into this school of thought (Wendt, 1999). Not surprisingly, 
process tracing figures prominently in the work of many conventional constructivists (Risse, et 
al, 1999, for example). 
It is more challenging to reconcile the technique with a second, interpretive view, though 
some scholars are attempting to do so (Autesserre, 2009; Hopf, 2002, 2007, 2012; Pouliot, 2007). 
Here, agents and structures are so inherently mutually constitutive that it is not possible to 
separate events into discrete moves in which either the agent or the structure is primarily driving 
the process. If indeed mutual constitution is completely continuous at all levels of analysis, then 
it is impossible to break out “variables” as being causes or consequences of one another. 
However, one can often break down events and discern steps at which an agent – for example, a 
norm entrepreneur – is contesting social structures, and steps at which a structure prevents agents 
from acting upon or even conceiving of courses of action that are taboo. In fact, a similar 
bracketing strategy has been endorsed by several prominent (conventional) constructivists 
(Wendt, 1987; Finnemore, 1996). 
A third, radical or post-modern view maintains that language, arguably the most central 
of all social structures, is inherently ambiguous and open to many interpretations. The danger 
here is that all narratives are reduced to story-telling, a critique that has also been raised against 
process tracing (Norkus, 2005). We should note, however, that even these radical forms of 
constructivism have increasingly developed standards of evidence. We thus now have clear ‘how 
to’ guides for conducting systematic discourse and textual analysis (Hansen, 2006; Neumann, 
2008; Hopf, 2002: chapter 1). Moreover, genealogical methods – the historical reconstruction of 
discourses – bear a strong family resemblance to some historical forms of process tracing (Price, 
1997). Finally, in recent years, there has been a strong move to ‘bring practice back in’ to the 
study of discourse (Pouliot, 2010), which provides an interpretive nod to the central importance 
of process. 
In sum, while there are philosophical hurdles to surmount – or perhaps better said, to be 
bracketed – we see intriguing possibilities for developing a richer understanding of process 
tracing by drawing upon these various strands of interpretive social science. This is precisely the 
challenge that Pouliot takes up in his contribution below (Pouliot, this volume). 
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Bayesianism and Process Tracing. The Bayesian approach to confirming and choosing among 
explanations has became an increasingly popular one in the philosophy of science, and it is 
closely related to process tracing in ways that illuminate the latter’s strengths and limits 
(Bennett, 2008). Both Bayesianism and process tracing rely on using evidence to affirm some 
explanations and cast doubt upon others, and each approach emphasizes that the probative value 
of evidence relative to competing explanations is more important than the number of pieces of 
evidence. Both argue for the possibility that a few pieces of evidence with high probative value, 
and in some instances even just one piece of evidence, can allow observers who approach a case 
with different theoretical priors to converge in their views on the proper explanation of the case. 
The Bayesian approach involves using evidence to update one’s beliefs in the likelihood 
that alternative explanations are true. Of course not all evidence is decisive, and some may be 
consistent with several competing explanations. In this regard, Stephen Van Evera has developed 
a very useful terminology for discussing the probative value of alternative kinds of evidentiary 
tests of theories that tracks closely with Bayesian logic. In Van Evera’s view, the probative value 
of evidence depends on the degree to which a hypothesis uniquely predicts that evidence, and the 
degree to which it is certain in doing so; another way to think of this is whether finding particular 
evidence is necessary and/or sufficient for a theory to be likely to be true (Van Evera, 1997: 31–
32; see also Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2011). 
From the four possible combinations of (non)uniqueness and (un)certainty, Van Evera 
derives four tests. Hoop tests involve evidence that is certain, but not unique; failing a hoop test 
disqualifies an explanation, but passing it does not greatly increase confidence in that 
explanation. Hoop tests are thus most useful in excluding alternative hypotheses. Van Evera’s 
example of a hoop test is: “Was the accused in the state on the day of the murder?” Failing this 
hoop test falsifies the hypothesis. If the accused was not in the state, they are not the murderer. 
Whether passing a hoop test constitutes strong evidence of the truth of the hypothesis depends on 
how frequently the “pass” condition occurs naturally (Mahoney, 2012: 7). In Van Evera’s 
example, if the accused is always in the state, there is zero probability they will fail the hoop test, 
so the suspect’s having passed the test is not very definitive. Also, the higher the number of other 
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suspects that were in the state at the time of the murder, the less this hoop test increases the 
likelihood that any particular one of them is the murderer.  
Smoking gun tests are unique, but not certain. Passing a smoking gun test is sufficient for 
strongly affirming an explanation, but passing such a test is not necessary to build confidence in 
an explanation. In Van Evera’s example, a smoking gun in a suspect’s hands right after a murder 
strongly implicates that suspect, but the absence of such a smoking gun does not exonerate this 
suspect. Smoking gun tests are therefore usually used to instantiate a hypothesis. Again, the 
strength of a smoking gun test depends on how often the condition in question occurs on its own 
(Mahoney, 2012: 8–9). If the murder took place at a shooting range, or especially if it happened 
at a crowded shooting range during a reunion of the victim’s dysfunctional family, the presence 
of a smoking gun in the suspect’s hand may not be very definitive. 
Doubly decisive tests use evidence that is both unique and certain, or that is necessary and 
sufficient to provide great confidence in an explanation. Van Evera uses the example of a bank 
camera that catches the faces of all those involved in robbing the bank. To convict an individual 
in the robbery, it is both necessary and sufficient to show that their face matches the camera 
footage; to exonerate an individual, it is necessary and sufficient to show that their features do 
not match the bank video. 
Finally, tests that are neither unique nor certain – neither necessary nor sufficient – are 
straw in the wind tests. Any one such test is not very decisive, but it is possible that a series of 
such tests might increase confidence in one explanation and decrease that in others, just as a 
suspect might be convicted on the basis of many pieces of circumstantial evidence (Mahoney, 
2012: 15). 
Thus, in both Bayesianism and process tracing, what matters in determining our 
confidence in alternative explanations of a case is not so much the number of pieces of evidence 
as the probative value of the evidence relative to the competing explanations. Of course, it is 
impossible to consider all the potential alternative explanations, as these would include 
explanations that researchers have not yet conceived. Bayesians have argued that one should thus 
include all alternative explanations that have actually been proposed (Earman, 1992: 84–85). For 
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sure, this approach is incomplete and new hypotheses may be conceived in the future, which is 
one reason why Bayesians never attach 100% probability to the likelihood that a theory is true, 
an attitude that we urge practitioners of process tracing to adopt as well. 
Bayesian logic gives a justification for the common intuition among process tracers that 
diversity and independent evidence are useful in testing explanations (Earman, 1992: 78–79, 
119–120, 132; Hellman, 1997: 202–209). When evidence on a particular step of a process 
becomes sufficiently repetitive that it is to be expected, it loses any ability to further discriminate 
among competing hypotheses. In contrast, independent evidence on a new or different dimension 
or stage of a hypothesized process retains the potential for surprising us and forcing us to revise 
our priors. 
Process tracing and Bayesian analysis are also similar in that both proceed as much by 
eliminating alternative hypotheses as by providing support for those that fit observed processes.
4
 
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle gives an excellent account of this ‘eliminative induction’ when he has 
his fictional detective Sherlock Holmes argue that an investigation “starts upon the supposition 
that when you have eliminated all which is impossible, then whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth. It may well be that several explanations remain, in which case one 
tries test after test until one or other of them has a convincing amount of support” (Doyle, 
1930/2003: 528–9). 
IV. Techniques and Standards of Process Tracing 
Process tracing usually proceeds through a mix of induction and deduction. The 
particular mix in a research project depends on the prior state of knowledge and theorizing about 
the phenomenon and case selected for study, and on whether the case is similar to a defined 
population of cases or is an outlier vis-a-vis this population. For phenomena on which there is 
little prior knowledge and for cases that are not well-explained by extant theories, process tracing 
proceeds primarily through inductive study. This often involves analyzing events backward 
through time from the outcome of interest to potential antecedent causes, much as a homicide 
detective might start by trying to piece together the last few hours or days in the life of a victim. 
                                                          
4
 See also the discussion of equifinality below. 
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In this process, the researcher takes in a lot of information that may or may not later 
become part of the hypothesized explanation, a phase that some have colloquially called 
“soaking and poking.” Here, one immerses oneself in the details of the case and tries out proto-
hypotheses that may either quickly prove to be dead ends or become plausible and worthy of 
more rigorous testing. It is important that the investigator be open to all kinds of possible 
explanations and be willing to follow the evidence wherever it leads. The more promising 
potential explanations uncovered in this way can then be rendered more formal and deductive 
and tested more rigorously against evidence in the case or in other cases that is independent of 
the evidence that gave rise to each hypothesis. 
If theories that appear to offer potential explanations of a case already exist, or after such 
theories have been developed inductively, process tracing can proceed more deductively. A key 
step here is to develop case-specific observable implications of the theories in question (Bakke, 
2013, for an excellent example; see also the discussion in Jacobs, this volume), as theories are 
seldom specified in such precise ways that they offer tight predictions on the observable 
implications that should be evident in particular cases. It is also important to cast the net widely 
for alternative explanations, including theoretical explanations in the academic literature, the 
more context-specific arguments that historians or regional or functional experts have offered, 
the implicit theories of journalists or others following the case, and the understandings 
participants have about what they are doing and why they are doing it. As researchers develop 
observable implications of hypothesized mechanisms, they should be on the lookout for 
particularly valuable kinds of evidence that allow for hoop, smoking gun, and doubly decisive 
tests. 
Iteration between the inductive and deductive sides of process tracing is very common. 
The most important methodological safeguard here is that researchers should seek to identify 
additional observable implications or what Imre Lakatos called “new facts” to test each 
modification to a hypothesis in order to avoid confirmation bias. Particularly valuable are new 
testable implications that, if found, would fit only the modified theory and not the alternative 
explanations, or that had not already been observed and had not been used to construct the 
hypothesis (Lakatos, 1970). As noted above, it is not necessary for evidence to come from a 
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different case than that which led to the development of a new hypothesis; it is only necessary 
that any new evidence from within the case be independent of the evidence that generated the 
hypothesis. 
There is a related distinction between evidence that is unavailable and evidence that is 
contrary to the process tracing expectations of a hypothesis. Evidence that is unavailable at the 
time of the research, such as classified information, lowers the upper limit of the probability one 
can attach to the likely truth of an explanation. One useful technique here is to predict what the 
unavailable evidence will indicate once it becomes available; such predictions, if borne out, 
provide strong confirmatory evidence. This was precisely the strategy followed by one of us 
where process tracing was employed to test hypotheses on socialization mechanisms in small 
group settings within international organizations. On the basis of interviews and a reading of 
primary documentation, predictions were made about socialization dynamics; these were 
subsequently confirmed through the release of previously classified meeting minutes (Checkel, 
2003). 
Evidence that is contrary to the process tracing predictions of an explanation lowers the 
likelihood that the explanation is true. The explanation may need to be modified if it is to 
become convincing once again. This modification may be a trivial one involving a substitutable 
and logically equivalent step in the hypothesized process, or it could be a more fundamental 
change to the explanation. The bigger the modification, the more important it is to generate and 
test new observable implications to guard against ‘just so’ stories that explain away anomalies 
one at a time. 
Inferences from process tracing also depend in part on the likelihood that one would 
expect to be able to find and have access to certain kinds of evidence. Debates on alternative 
explanations often turn on the question of whether “absence of evidence” constitutes “evidence 
of absence.” If we expect evidence to be readily accessible and doubly decisive – as when we 
feel around for change in our pocket – we might infer that failure to find something constitutes 
evidence it does not exist (although many of us have found lost keys or other items only on the 
third or fourth attempt of looking in the same place). If we expect evidence to be hard to find or 
access, as when thinking social actors have gone to great lengths to hide evidence of their actions 
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or motives, then absence of evidence might not greatly lower our expectation that an entity or 
relationship exists. Yet even when actors have motives to hide evidence, sufficient access to sites 
where such evidence, if it existed, would be available, may convince researchers that the 
evidence (and the entity or relationship related to it) does not exist. 
Consider the US experience in Iraq post-2003. After U.S. military forces spent many 
months searching intensively for weapons of mass destruction and interviewing captured 
officials who had been in positions to know about any such weapons, nearly all observers 
concluded that Iraq never had them. The large development programs required would have left 
behind documentary and physical evidence. 
In addition, process tracing helps address the limits of Mill’s methods of comparison. 
Mill himself recognized that omitted variables and the possible presence of equifinality – that is, 
multiple paths to the same outcome – could threaten inferences based on comparison alone. 
Process tracing on omitted variables and residual differences (or similarities) between two cases 
can address the former problem. At the same time, process tracing can show that the explanation 
of interest was indeed likely to have been true, even if it represents only one of several possible 
paths to the outcome (George and Bennett, 2005: 153–160, 254). 
Process tracing can also readily be combined with quantitative techniques in a mixed-
method design. Building upon Lieberman’s (2005, 2009) idea of nested analysis, for example, it 
can be applied to a few cases selected from a statistical analysis to clarify whether the direction 
of causal influence is indeed from the independent variable to the dependent variable, and not the 
reverse, and to help assess whether any observed correlations might be spurious.
5
 In these ways, 
process tracing on the mechanisms hypothesized in statistical models can greatly increase the 
confidence in the causal significance of the correlations identified in them. 
In a variation on the above, (quasi-) quantitative techniques such as agent-based 
modeling can be used to check the plausibility of inferences about causal mechanisms derived 
from process tracing. Consider contemporary research on civil war, where a central finding is 
                                                          
5
 Nested analysis is just one of several mixed-method designs where process tracing can play a central role. See 
Dunning, this volume. 
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that such conflicts are anything but ‘civil’: mechanisms of transnational diffusion play central 
roles. Scholars have now utilized process tracing to document a number of these mechanisms, 
including framing, resource mobilization and social learning (Checkel, 2013: passim). 
Such findings can be strengthened through the careful application of agent-based 
modeling, where one assesses the plausibility of the mechanisms by using computer simulation. 
If the results of the simulations resemble the empirical patterns of conflict diffusion uncovered 
through process tracing, then the validity of the posited causal relation is strengthened (Nome 
and Weidmann, 2013; see also Hoffmann, 2008; and Hedstroem and Ylikoski, 2010: 62–63). 
 
Standards of Good Process Tracing. With these definitional, philosophical and operational 
preliminaries in hand, we now return to the challenge highlighted in the chapter’s opening pages. 
How do we know a particular piece of process tracing research is good process tracing? More 
colloquially, how would we recognize good process tracing if it were to walk through the door? 
We argue for a three-part standard for what counts as a good application of process 
tracing (see also Bennett and Elman, 2007; Bennett, 2010; Checkel, 2008; and Checkel, 2013: 
chapter 1). Meta-theoretically, it will be grounded in a philosophical base that is ontologically 
consistent with mechanism-based understandings of social reality and methodologically plural. 
While we favoured scientific realism above, there is sufficient (and inevitable) uncertainty at this 
philosophical level to leave the door open for related approaches such as analytic eclecticism 
(Katzenstein and Sil, 2010) or pragmatism (Johnson, 2006).
6
 Contextually, it will utilize this 
pluralism both to reconstruct carefully causal processes and not to lose sight of broader 
structural-discursive context. Methodologically, it will take equifinality seriously, which means 
to consider the alternative causal pathways through which the outcome of interest might have 
occurred. 
With these three signposts in hand, we argue that good process tracing needs then to 
address ten specific criteria, the importance of which vary as a function of the question asked, 
                                                          
6
 We are not arguing there should be an explicit discussion of meta-theory for each empirical application of process 
tracing. Rather, at a minimum, there needs to be an appreciation that positivism is inadequate for dealing with 
concepts such as mechanism and techniques like process tracing. See also Pouliot, this volume. For a contrasting 
view, see Hall, 2012. 
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state of disciplinary knowledge, and the theories being tested. We start with four general criteria, 
and then discuss six that are especially relevant for process tracing. 
1) Cast the net widely for alternative explanations. 
As noted above, Bayesians rightly argue that explanations are more convincing to the 
extent that the evidence is inconsistent with alternative explanations. Failing to consider a 
potentially viable explanation that readily occurs to the readers and critics of a case study can 
make the process tracing unconvincing. The consequences of leaving out a viable explanation, 
which can lead not only to poor inferences but failed academic job interviews and rejections 
from peer-reviewed journals, are sufficiently serious that it is important to consider a wide range 
of alternatives despite the effort this entails.
7
 
Specifically, researchers should at a minimum assess the process tracing evidence on the 
explanations that political scientists, sociologists, historians, regional specialists, and functional 
experts have offered for the specific case under study and for the class(es) of cases or phenomena 
of which it is an instance. In addition, it is often useful to render in theoretical terms and do 
process tracing upon the understandings of actor behavior offered by participants and journalists. 
Often these will overlap with scholars’ explanations of the case, but occasionally they point to 
viable explanations that have been overlooked. 
An additional criterion for assessing the adequacy of potential explanations is to ask 
whether any major theoretical categories of social explanation have been omitted. These include 
explanations based on actors’ material power, institutional constraints and opportunities, and 
social norms or legitimacy (Mahoney, 2008). In our own subfield of international relations, these 
correspond with realist, neoliberal institutionalist, and constructivist theories. Another taxonomic 
dimension to check is whether both agent-based and structural explanations have been 
considered. Structural constraints can be material, institutional, or normative, for example, and 
agents can be motivated by rational calculations of material interests, cognitive biases, emotional 
drives, or normative concerns. 
                                                          
7
 Schimmelfennig, this volume, notes the tradeoff here between comprehensiveness and efficiency, and - compared 
to the present discussion - he puts more emphasis on the latter. 
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As process tracing often involves exploring what individuals knew when and how they 
behaved, there is a risk of overlooking normative or material structural contexts (see also Pouliot, 
this volume). For example, in earlier work, one of us used process tracing to explore the social-
psychological factors that might lead decision-makers to change their minds in light of 
persuasive appeals (Checkel, 2003). Yet, as critics noted, the argument overlooked structural 
context, simply assuming that persuasive arguments were a function of individual-level 
dynamics alone. It was equally plausible, however, that the persuader’s arguments were 
legitimated by the broader social discourse in which he/she was embedded. In positivist-
empiricist terms, there was a potential problem of omitted variable bias, while, for interpretivists, 
the issue was one of missing the broader forces that enable and make possible human agency 
(Neumann, 2008). 
Considering normative, material, power, efficiency, legitimacy, structural, and agent-
based factors makes for a long list of potential alternative explanations, but not every one will 
merit or require detailed process tracing. Some may be irrelevant to the case at hand, and others 
may be easily dismissed in the footnotes on the basis of one or a few pieces of obvious or well-
known process-tracing evidence. Yet the consequences of leaving out a viable explanation 
generally outweigh the efforts necessary to consider many potential ones. 
2) Be equally tough on the alternative explanations. 
Being equally tough on alternative explanations does not require going into equal depth 
in process tracing on every one of them. Some explanations may be quickly undermined by the 
evidence, while others will require deeper investigation. Some explanations may be more 
counterintuitive or, put another way, have a lower prior expectation of being true, and may thus 
require more evidence to convince ourselves and others even if initial process tracing evidence 
suggests they may be true. Some explanations may be more novel than others, and there may be 
more value-added in exploring these. There is also a tendency, and a justifiable one in the 
Bayesian view, to generate more detailed evidence on the explanations that appear to be more 
and more likely to be true as the evidence cumulates. 
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Research in cognitive science, however, reminds us of a common tendency toward 
confirmation bias, and one goal of methodology should be to counteract such biases. In this 
regard, fairness to alternative explanations requires that we fully consider evidence that fails to 
fit the explanations that interest us most, as well as evidence that fits explanations that initially 
interest or convince us the least. Some case studies accord an unduly privileged status to one 
explanation by granting it ‘first mover advantage’ (Caporaso, Checkel, Jupille, 2003). That is, 
they perform process tracing on this explanation and turn to evidence on the alternative 
explanations only to address the anomalies that confront the privileged first mover. A far better 
procedure is to outline the process tracing predictions of a wide range of alternative explanations 
of a case in advance, and then to consider the actual evidence for and against each explanation. 
3) Consider the potential biases of evidentiary sources. 
Because scholars have developed and explicated Bayesian logic largely with reference to 
the physical sciences, they have devoted relatively little attention to the question of how to judge, 
or discount, evidence provided by agents who have instrumental motives to convince observers 
that some explanations are stronger than others. Yet this is a pervasive problem in the social 
sciences, and Bayesianism offers a useful framework for addressing it. When those providing 
evidence may have instrumental motives for putting forth particular explanations of their own or 
others’ behavior, researchers should apply a two-step Bayesian analysis. First, they should attach 
Bayesian priors to the possible instrumental motives of those providing evidence and weigh the 
evidence they give in light of those priors. Then, in a second step, researchers should use the 
evidence that sources provide to update prior expectations on these sources’ motives, and use 
these updated priors in assessing subsequent evidence. 
This sounds complex but in fact we make such judgments every day. Given A’s possible 
motives, how much should I trust what he/she says? Given what he/she has said, what are A’s 
likely motives? Social psychologists have long noted that audiences find an individual more 
convincing when that person espouses a view that is seemingly contrary to his/her instrumental 
goals. When Warren Buffet argues that wealthy Americans should pay more taxes, this is more 
convincing than when a person of moderate income argues for raising taxes on the rich. Bayesian 
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logic suggests this is a sensible procedure for accrediting or discounting evidence from 
individuals with potential instrumental goals for providing, distorting, or hiding evidence. 
For similar reasons, researchers should follow established advice on considering issues of 
context and authorship in assessing evidence. Spontaneous statements have a different 
evidentiary status from prepared remarks. Public statements have a different evidentiary status 
from private statements or statements that will remain classified for a period of time. Statements 
in front of some audiences may reflect different instrumental purposes from those in front of 
other audiences. In addition to weighing such factors in judging what individuals say, write, or 
do, researchers should also consider the instrumental motivations that can lead to selection bias 
in which statements, documents, and other sources participants make accessible or available. 
Newly empowered actors in control of the archives are likely to make available only negative 
information about their opponents and positive information about themselves. 
It is important to consider as well any potential selection biases in secondary sources. 
Historians are always at risk of selectively choosing the primary and secondary sources that 
confirm their arguments. For this reason, it is important to consider a wide range of secondary 
accounts representing contending historiographical schools and explanations (Lustick, 1996). 
4) Take into account whether the case is most or least likely for alternative explanations. 
Prior expectations on the strength and scope conditions of a theory require the most 
updating when it fails to explain a case in which it is most likely to apply, or succeeds in 
explaining a case in which it is least likely to apply. Process tracing can play an important role in 
ensuring that such cases are not flukes, and that the scope conditions of prior theories need to be 
revised. If, for example, a theory’s failure in a most-likely case is caused by a variable that 
occurs only rarely or even only once, the scope conditions of the prior theory may need revision 
for only one or a few cases. However, if process tracing demonstrates that the prior theory failed 
due to a variable or interaction that is common, its scope conditions will require more radical 
revision. 
5) Make a justifiable decision on when to start. 
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Process tracing requires a researcher to choose and justify a starting point for 
investigating evidence on alternative explanations. Do we begin process tracing on the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, for example, at the point when President Kennedy learned of the Soviet effort to 
deploy missiles in Cuba, with the Russian Revolution in 1917, or with the environmental context 
in which humans have evolved over the centuries? There is no universal answer to such 
questions, as a justifiable starting point depends on how a researcher defines the puzzle or 
question they are trying to explain: crisis decision-making, great power ideological rivalry, or the 
extent to which humans have genetic predispositions regarding conflictual and cooperative 
behavior. 
Even within one well-defined research question, the proper starting point can be subject 
to debate. Just as any researcher’s decision on how far ‘down’ to go in gathering detailed 
evidence can be critiqued for going too far or not far enough, the selection of the point in time at 
which to start process tracing can be critiqued for being too far back or too proximate. Robert 
Putnam’s account of political differences between northern and southern Italy at the end of the 
twentieth century, for example, has been criticized for starting the explanatory story in the 
eleventh century, skipping over long periods of history, and downplaying or ignoring more 
historically proximate events that may have had powerful effects on regional politics (Putnam, 
1993; Tarrow, 1996: 393). 
Yet process tracing has to begin somewhere, and there are useful rules of thumb for 
deciding when to start. A reasonable place may be a critical juncture at which an institution or 
practice was contingent or open to alternative paths, and actors or exogenous events determined 
which path it would take. Path dependency theories suggest that institutions, once set on a 
particular path, often become locked in to that path by increasing returns, externalities, or other 
mechanisms (Pierson, 2000). A common critique of critical junctures is that they are identifiable 
only in retrospect, but process tracers have the luxury of always looking at them in retrospect. 
Still, in choosing a critical juncture as a starting point for process tracing, researchers 
have to consider whether earlier and later ones might also be relevant (hence Tarrow’s critique of 
Putnam), and they should also consider whether it is necessary to do process tracing on other 
potential but unrealized critical junctures before or after their chosen starting point (see also 
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Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). These are the points at which institutions could have changed, 
perhaps due to some exogenous shock, but did not. Such potential junctures are subject to more 
conceptual and interpretive debate than the junctures that in fact led to institutional change. In 
general, to the extent that a researcher locates the starting point for process tracing in the distant 
past, it is important to show how institutions or practices could have reproduced themselves for 
long periods of time, even if resources and word limits do not allow continuous process tracing 
on the long period between the starting point and the outcome. 
Another kind of starting point is the time at which a key actor or agent enters the scene or 
gains some material, ideational, relational, or informational capacity. This can be effective when 
alternative explanations hinge upon or work through the motivations, knowledge, and capacities 
of individual agents, and when particular agents behave differently, or with different effects, 
from their predecessors. 
6) Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence, but make a justifiable decision 
on when to stop. 
At times, social scientists using process tracing to assess alternative explanations of a 
case must be even more relentless than historians in tracking down primary sources or seeking 
interviews with participants. A single meeting or memo may prove to be the crucial piece of 
evidence that instantiates one explanation or undermines another. The more probative we expect 
evidence to be, the more time and effort we should be willing to expend to obtain it. Here, 
process tracers should use the Bayesian-inspired criteria above – smoking gun, doubly decisive, 
straw in wind, and hoop tests – to assess the potential probative value of data not yet obtained. 
Furthermore, Bayesian logic indicates that process tracers should seek diverse and 
independent streams of evidence. If you want to know whether an animal is a duck, for example, 
instead of just looking at how it walks, you should also consider how it flies, sounds, looks, and 
so on. This insight is consistent with arguments in the social sciences concerning triangulation 
among diverse data sources With triangulation, a researcher cross-checks the causal inferences 
derived from his/her process tracing by drawing upon distinct data streams (interviews, media 
reports, documents, say). 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 21/2012    32 
 
Yet triangulation is not a panacea, as its successful use requires that the error term in each 
stream of evidence, on average, points in such a way that it cancels those in others. If all the 
streams of evidence are subject to the same selection bias, however, then errors can cumulate, 
making researchers unaware of this problem ever more confident in a false explanation 
(Symposium, 2007: 10; Kuehn and Rohlfing, 2009). Seemingly “diverse” sources of evidence 
(documents, media coverage, interviews) could actually all originate from one or a few 
individuals with instrumental reasons to convince observers of a particular explanation. We 
return below to the importance of considering such potential biases in evidentiary sources. 
As it can demand both diverse and deep evidence, and may require significant “straw in 
the wind” evidence when the more definitive kind is not available, process tracing can be quite 
time consuming. Elizabeth Wood’s excellent study of the Salvadoran civil war, for example, 
advances a rich, process-based argument that draws on an enormous amount of information. Yet, 
it was also fifteen years in the making (Wood, 2003, xi–xv; see also Petersen, this volume). 
Carefully executed process tracing thus requires that researchers think at an early point about 
their own financial limits and temporal constraints. 
This point highlights the necessity of deciding when to stop gathering and analyzing 
evidence. There is no simple algorithm for deciding when to stop, and stopping at any point 
makes the researcher vulnerable to the possibility that just a little more research would have 
turned up evidence that would have greatly revised their estimate of the likely truth of alternative 
explanations. However, the Bayesian perspective discussed earlier offers a sensible logic here: 
One stops when repetition occurs. That is, a researcher should stop pursuing any one stream of 
evidence when it becomes so repetitive that gathering more of that same kind of evidence has a 
low probability of revising their estimate of the likely accuracy of alternative explanations.
8
 
For each test in determining whether an animal is a duck – walk, sounds, etc – a small 
sample is sufficient. A thousand steps or quacks provide no more convincing evidence than a 
few. Yet in deciding when to stop, there is no escaping the de facto tradeoff between the risk of 
stopping too soon and making poor inferences, and the risk of stopping too late and wasting time, 
                                                          
8
 While using different language, ethnographers advance a strikingly similar decision rule. Gusterson, 2008. 
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effort, and resources on evidence that proves to have no effect on one’s estimates on the 
verisimilitude of alternative explanations. 
7) Combine process tracing with case comparisons when useful for the research goal and 
feasible. 
Although some have argued that single case or “no variance” designs are weak (King, 
Keohane, and Verba, 1994), process tracing within single cases can in fact lead to convincing 
explanations if appropriate evidence is accessible. Moreover, if the explanations of these cases 
disprove claims of necessity or sufficiency, or if the cases are most likely for a theory that fails to 
explain them or least likely for an explanation that succeeds, their explanation can have more 
general implications for the veracity and scope conditions of contending theories. Yet for many 
inferential purposes, comparative case studies can be more powerful sources of inference than 
single case designs. 
In a most-similar case comparison, in which two cases differ on one independent variable 
and on the dependent variable, process tracing can help establish that the one independent 
variable that differs is related through a convincing hypothesized causal process to the difference 
in the cases’ outcomes. As most-similar cases rarely control for all but one potentially causal 
factor, process tracing can also establish that other differences between the cases do not account 
for the difference in their outcomes. Similarly, process tracing can help affirm that the one 
independent variable that is the same between two least-similar cases accounts for the similarity 
in their outcomes, and that similarities in other potentially causal factors do not explain the 
cases’ common outcome.  
An additional synergy between process tracing and case comparisons is that an 
explanation inductively derived from process tracing might lead the researcher to reconsider their 
case selection. If the close study of a case leads to the discovery of an omitted variable, adding 
this variable into the theoretical framework can change the definition of the relevant population 
of cases. Adding a variable can also change which cases are most-similar, least-similar, or 
deviant or anomalous, hence changing which cases are most useful to study for theory testing or 
theory development. 
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8) Be open to inductive insights. 
One of the great advantages of process tracing is that it puts researchers at risk of 
stumbling upon many potentially causal factors, evident in the details and sequences of events 
within a case, which they had not anticipated on the basis of their prior alternative hypotheses. 
Encountering such surprises provides opportunities to re-think the prior explanations of the case. 
It may be possible to revise these prior explanations in trivial ways to accommodate unexpected 
facts, or it may prove necessary to build new explanations or link surprising facts to extant 
theories that the researcher had not previously thought would apply to the case. In any event, it is 
important to pay attention to the feeling of surprise and to follow it up with efforts to explain 
surprising facts theoretically.  
9) Use deduction to ask “if my explanation is true, what will be the specific process leading 
to the outcome?” 
Prior to embarking on process tracing, researchers should clarify as much as possible the 
facts and sequences within a case that should be true if each of the alternative hypothesized 
explanations of the case is true. Which actors should have known, said, and did what, and when? 
Who should have interacted with, worried about, or allied with whom? We cannot stress enough 
that theories are usually stated in very general terms; they must therefore be operationalized and 
adapted to the specific processes predicted in particular cases (see also the discussion in Jacobs, 
this volume). 
For new explanations inductively derived from the evidence within a case, it is doubly 
important to forestall any confirmation bias by considering what other observable implications 
must be true if the new explanation is true. As noted above, these observable implications may 
be in other cases, but they could also be within the case from which the new theory was derived 
as long as they are independent from the evidence that gave rise to it. Either way, if additional 
observable implications can be derived from the new explanation and tested against new 
evidence, this can provide a check against confirmation bias. 
10) Remember that conclusive process tracing is good, but not all good process tracing is 
conclusive. 
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The more continuous a narrative explanation of a case, and the closer the evidence fits 
some explanations and not others, the more confidence we can have in explanatory inferences 
based on process tracing (but see also Schimmelfennig, this volume). There may well be 
temporal or spatial gaps in the evidence bearing on hypothesized processes, however, such as 
documents that have been destroyed or remain classified, or participants who are unwilling or 
unable to submit to interviews. In addition, in some case studies the available evidence may be 
equally consistent with two or more hypotheses that offer incompatible explanations of the case. 
When the evidence does not allow high levels of confidence in supporting some hypotheses and 
discounting others, it is important to acknowledge the level of uncertainty that remains.  
As the foregoing indicates, good process tracing builds in part on standard injunctions 
and checks that are applicable to an array of qualitative methods (criteria 1–4). These include 
attention to research design and potential biases in evidentiary sources, as well as caution in the 
application of triangulation. At the same time, it demands adherence to additional best practice 
standards – criteria 5 through 10 – that address problems related to testing inductively-generated 
insights in ways that reduce the risks of “curve-fitting.” 
For sure, not all ten criteria elaborated above may be relevant for any given study. 
However, they should serve as a starting point and checklist, thus maximizing the likelihood of 
conducting good process tracing. So defined and operationalized, the technique is far more than a 
temporal sequencing of events or mere “detective work” based on hunches and intuition (Gerring 
2007a, 178). 
V. Process Tracing on General Categories of Theories 
The kinds of process tracing evidence that are relevant and the veracity, accessibility, and 
biases of that evidence are often specific to the explanations a researcher is considering and the 
cases they have chosen to study. The extent to which alternative explanations are mutually 
exclusive or complementary also varies greatly depending on the explanations and cases studied. 
Nonetheless, useful general observations can be made about the kinds of process tracing 
opportunities and challenges that arise with different general modes of explanation common in 
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the social sciences. Here, we consider process tracing on rational choice, cognitive, 
material/structural, normative/structural, and institutional/functional-efficiency theories. 
Rational choice theories argue that actors have complete and transitive preferences and 
that they choose courses of behavior that maximize the expected value of likely outcomes given 
the information available to them. Some early theorists made ‘as-if’ assumptions, or assumptions 
that obviated the need for process tracing by arguing that it was unnecessary to show that actors 
actually made rational calculations so long as outcomes arose as if actors had done so. So-called 
thick rational choice approaches make further assumptions by presuming that actors have certain 
preferences, such as for gains in material resources or power. Rational choice theorists, however, 
have increasingly been willing to eschew as-if assumptions and engage in process tracing. That 
is, they accept the challenge of making only thin assumptions to the effect that actors decide 
through rational processes. They then seek to discover actor’s preferences by observation, 
demonstrating empirically that actors actually do make calculations and choices through rational 
processes to maximize their preferences (Bates, et al, 1998; Schimmelfennig, 2003; see also 
Checkel, this volume). 
This raises several challenges for process tracing. For one, there is the revealed 
preference problem. How can we infer actors’ real preferences, given that they are often engaged 
in strategic contexts that provide incentives to misrepresent those preferences? In addition, how 
can we avoid circularity or tautology by inferring preferences separately from the behavioral 
choices that these preferences are supposed to explain? There is a danger that – no matter what 
the outcome – the researcher can change his/her measurement of the actors’ preferences so that 
the chosen outcome was a value-maximizing one. 
In view of these challenges, the only option is to infer preferences from an actor’s earlier 
rhetoric and actions and use these preferences to explain subsequent behavior, while also 
investigating the possibility that preferences may change over time through learning, changing 
life cycle stages/aging, or other processes. In particular, if actors engage in costly signaling – 
rhetoric or actions that impose high political or material costs if preferences are not consistent 
with these statements or acts – this may be taken as a relatively reliable indicator of preferences. 
A good example is David Laitin’s study of how Russian speakers in the non-Russian former 
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Soviet Republics chose between teaching their children the titular language of the country in 
which they resided (such as Latvian) or their native Russian. Laitin convincingly uses statements 
from the individuals making these choices, as well as aggregate data, to show that they 
conceived of them as involving a tradeoff between passing along to the children an exclusive 
focus on their Russian language and heritage or maximizing the children’s’ employment 
opportunities. Those who chose to have their children invest in the newly-dominant local 
language revealed their preference for employability over linguistic heritage (Laitin, 1998). 
Even if preferences can be reliably inferred, however, rational choice arguments face a 
second hurdle in demonstrating that decision processes maximized actors’ expected utilities 
given their preferences and the information at their disposal. This makes it very important to 
establish the information actors had and when they had it. This stage of rational choice 
explanations is often tested through process tracing against the alternative explanation that 
actors’ decisions are influenced by cognitive errors and biases. David Lake, for example, uses 
process tracing to compare a rational choice approach, in this case a bargaining theory model, 
and an “error and bias” explanation of U.S. decisionmaking on the 2003 intervention in Iraq. 
Lake concludes that Iraqi leaders failed to consider readily available costly signals of American 
resolve and American leaders ignored ample evidence on the likely costs of war, so that 
“misrepresentation by the other side was far less of a problem than self-delusion” (Lake, 
2010/2011: 45).  
If rational choice explanations face a revealed preference problem, cognitive theories face 
a problem of accurately inferring revealed beliefs. Actors may have instrumental reasons, such as 
an interest in winning political support from groups or individuals, for publicly espousing ideas 
that they do not actually believe. One option here is to compare actors’ public statements with 
available private deliberations that they expected would not be revealed for some time. Yuen 
Foong Khong, for example, compares the analogies American leaders used in public to justify 
the Vietnam War with those they used in private policy discussions that were de-classified many 
years later, checking to see if actors chose the same analogies in both settings. He concludes that 
with the exception of the analogy to France’s disastrous experience in Vietnam, which was used 
only in private, they did so (Khong, 1992: 60-61; see also Jacobs, this volume). 
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Actors may also make statements authored by their staffs or pushed upon them by 
powerful individuals or groups, so it is important to establish the provenance and authorship of 
public statements, and to give spontaneous and unplanned statements more weight than planned 
ones as indicators of genuine beliefs. Also, stated beliefs that incur substantial audience costs are 
more likely to reflect genuine beliefs, and recollections of beliefs held in the past that are backed 
up by documentary evidence are more credible than those lacking such supporting evidence. In 
addition, research by social psychologists shows that the recall of past beliefs is likely to be more 
accurate the more intense was the social context surrounding their creation (Wood, 2003: 33–
34). Finally, we should expect evidence that an actor holds socially stigmatized beliefs to be 
harder to find than evidence that an actor shares widely accepted beliefs, so we should treat 
absence of evidence on the former differently from absence of evidence on the latter.
9
 
Theories that emphasize material power and structure require that actors be aware of 
power differentials and that they circumscribe their behavior when faced with more powerful 
opponents. This raises several process tracing challenges. First, actors engaged in strategic 
interaction may have incentives to either exaggerate their capabilities (to bluff) or to understate 
them (to preserve the option of surprising adversaries). The same applies to actors’ publicly-
stated assessments of other actors’ power capabilities. This can create conflicting evidence on 
actors’ estimates of their own and others’ material power. 
Second, power is often strongest as an explanation when it has a taken-for-granted 
quality. It may successfully deter actors from publicly discussing or even contemplating possible 
courses of action.
10
 This makes it difficult to distinguish whether an actor was deterred from 
doing something or never had an interest in doing it in the first place. It also means that 
exceptions to power explanations – cases in which actors thought their higher level of 
commitment would enable them to prevail over better-endowed adversaries – are more evident 
and easier to document because these situations become overt conflicts, such as wars, labor 
strikes, or attempted revolutions, rather than being non-events.  
                                                          
9
 On all these points, see Jacobs’ chapter below. Jacobs, this volume. 
10
 It is only a short step from this understanding to what interpretive theorists call productive power, or power that is 
constitutive of agent interests and identities. Barnett and Duvall, 2005; see also Pouliot, this volume. 
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Nonetheless, it is possible to use process tracing to assess power explanations by paying 
careful attention to sequencing and to what information actors had and when they had it. For 
example, scholars have offered two competing explanations of the 1898 Fashoda crisis between 
Great Britain and France over control of the headwaters region of the Nile River. Christopher 
Layne gives a straightforward power explanation: France backed down because Britain had 
superior military power (Layne, 1994: 28–33). Kenneth Schultz advances an explanation based 
not only on power differentials, but also on the ability of democracies to credibly commit to use 
military power when both ruling and opposition parties support this stance (Schultz, 2001: 175–
95). Schultz’s process tracing makes his explanation more convincing because it explains the 
puzzle of why a weaker France challenged Britain in the first place, when Britain’s resolve was 
unclear, and it demonstrates that France backed down precisely when Britain’s democratic 
institutions made its threat to use force credible and France’s democracy laid bare the political 
divisions that undermined its resolve. 
Like material structure arguments, theories about norms – a form of social structure – 
need to show that norms prevented actors from doing things they otherwise would have done. A 
good example is Nina Tannenwald’s research on the non-use of nuclear weapons since the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To show that normative constraints explain this outcome, 
Tannenwald has to demonstrate that norms against the use of nuclear weapons – rather than their 
limited battlefield utility – explain their non-use. Accordingly, Tannenwald provides direct, 
process-tracing evidence that American presidents and their advisors chafed at the perceived 
normative constraint of the American public’s revulsion at the idea of using nuclear weapons 
after the effects of nuclear fallout became more widely known. She also demonstrates that these 
same leaders often avoided even officially considering the option of using nuclear weapons for 
fear that their deliberations would be leaked to the public (Tannenwald, 2007). 
Finally, institutional explanations that rely on functional efficiency and transaction costs 
must be able to demonstrate through process tracing how such costs affect compliance. A good 
example is Ron Mitchell’s study of international environmental cooperation over the sea. In 
particular, he uses process tracing to demonstrate that the international regime to prevent the 
dumping of oil residue from tankers failed to reach high compliance levels due to high 
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transactions costs. In contrast, the international regime to force oil tanker owners to install 
expensive anti-pollution equipment succeeded in motivating high compliance because it made 
non-compliance transparent and provided low-cost means of sanctioning tanker owners who 
failed to comply (Mitchell, 1994). 
VI. Conclusion and Preview 
This introduction and the chapters that follow seek to consolidate the turn to process and 
mechanisms in contemporary social science. We do this not by exploring new substantive 
empirical domains or developing novel theories; rather, we focus on the prior, operational and 
methodological issue of how we come to know when studying process. As has been argued 
elsewhere, the central challenge here is to avoid “lazy mechanism-based storytelling” 
(Hedstroem and Ylikoski, 2010: 58, 64). We could not agree more, and hope that our conceptual 
parsing and applied discussions of process tracing strike readers as anything but lazy. 
Preview. The volume has three parts. Part I is comprised of this introductory essay. It historicizes 
the term process tracing, grounds it philosophically, and advances specific criteria for 
distinguishing good process tracing from bad. 
The six chapters in Part II are the manuscript’s core, assessing the contributions of 
process tracing in particular research programs or bodies of theory, including ideational theory, 
work on international institutions, the European Union, the comparative politics subfield, the end 
of the Cold War, and the literature on conflict processes. These chapters are resolutely applied – 
connecting method to practice – with recognized experts assessing the strengths and weaknesses 
of process tracing as applied to particular substantive domains. They include process tracing for 
inductive/theory-development (ch.7 – Petersen) and deductive/theory-testing purposes (ch.4 – 
Schimmelfennig); micro-level process tracing on cognitive theories (ch.2 – Jacobs); macro-level 
process tracing on structural theories (ch.5 – Waldner); process tracing on the interplay of 
individuals and institutions (ch.3 – Checkel); interpretive “practice tracing” (ch.9 – Pouliot); and 
process tracing that focuses on explaining key historical cases (ch.6 – Evangelista). 
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Whatever the application and type of process tracing, all essays address the standards 
articulated in the present chapter and work from a common template of questions – what are the 
best examples of process tracing in your subfield; the evidentiary and interpretive matters 
relevant to the topics you research; the process tracing issues specific to the kind of theories on 
which you have focused – to assess critically the good and bad when process tracing is applied. 
Collectively, the analyses highlight issues of data quality, the role of hypothesized causal 
mechanisms, time and resource constraints, research ethics, multi-method strategies where 
process tracing is one technique in play, and theory development, among others. 
In addition, contributors are asked to address policy, by making a comparison between 
theories and arguments that are structural in nature and those stressing mechanisms, process 
tracing and dynamics. Many argue that the latter – the focus of this volume – are better at 
capturing the complex world with which policymakers must deal. Is this correct? To paraphrase 
the late Alexander George, is the result better ‘theory for policy’ (George, 1993)? 
Our answer is a cautious ‘yes.’ Process tracing conducted on the observable implications 
of mechanisms gives decisionmakers new insight on a range of potentially ‘manipulable’ factors. 
Yet, this down-in-the trenches research should be done smartly, which is to say it must 
simultaneously be attentive to broader environmental, ethical and structural contexts (see also 
Chapter 10, this volume).
11
 
In Part III, we step back and – in three separate essays – explore the research frontier. 
Chapter 8 makes explicit a theme touched upon in several earlier contributions – the relation of 
process tracing to quantitative methods – and does so by highlighting the key role it can and 
should play in multi-method research. If this analysis bridges different methodological traditions, 
then Chapter 9 goes a step further, examining the role of process tracing in interpretive social 
science. It explores the gap that separates positivist and post-positivist understandings of the 
technique, and argues that an engagement around the concept of practice can minimize the meta-
theoretical challenges involved in bridging such a divide. 
                                                          
11
 More formally, our intent here is to push contributors to think counterfactually: Absent process tracing and 
mechanisms, how and in what ways would policy recommendations in their particular area of study differ? 
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In Chapter 10, the co-editors revisit the standards of good process tracing, synthesize and 
critique the volume as a whole, and outline an agenda for future development of and research on 
process tracing. In particular, proponents of process tracing need to remember that method is not 
an end in itself; rather, it is a tool helping us build and test theory. And the latter remains a 
central challenge for process tracers – how to combine the technique’s use with the development 
of cumulable social science theory (see also Hedstroem and Ylikoski, 2010: 61–62). Moreover, 
process tracing is only one way to capture process. Future work thus needs to integrate this 
volume’s findings with insights gleaned from statistical approaches, agent-based modeling 
exercises, and applications of discourse analysis, among others.  
  Process Tracing: From Philosphical Roots to Best Practice    43 
 
References 
Adler, Emanuel. 2002. “Constructivism and International Relations.” In Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse, Beth Simmons, Editors. Handbook of International Relations. London: 
Sage Publications. 
Autesserre, Severine. 2009. “Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence and International 
Intervention.” International Organization 63/2: 249–80. 
Bakke, Kristin. 2013. “Copying and Learning from Outsiders? Assessing Diffusion from 
Transnational Insurgents in the Chechen Wars.” In Jeffrey T. Checkel, Editor. 
Transnational Dynamics of Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics.” International 
Organization 59/1: 39–75. 
Bates, Robert, Barry Weingast, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. 1998. 
Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Bennett, Andrew and Colin Elman. 2007. “Case Study Methods in the International Relations 
Subfield.” Comparative Political Studies 40/2: 170–95. 
Bennett, Andrew. 2008. “Process Tracing: A Bayesian Approach.” In Janet Box-Steffensmeier, 
Henry Brady and David Collier, Editors, Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
-------. 2010. “Process Tracing and Causal Inference.” In Henry Brady and David Collier, 
Editors. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, 2
nd
 Edition. 
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 
Brady, Henry and David Collier. Editors. 2010. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, 
Shared Standards, 2
nd
 Edition. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 
Capoccia, Giovanni and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2007. “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism.” World Politics 59/3: 341–
369. 
Caporaso, James, Jeffrey T. Checkel and Joseph Jupille. 2003. “Integrating Institutions: 
Rationalism, Constructivism and the Study of the European Union – Introduction.” 
Comparative Political Studies 36/1–2: 7–41. 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2003. “’Going Native’ in Europe? Theorizing Social Interaction in European 
Institutions.” Comparative Political Studies 36/1–2: 209–31. 
-------. 2008. “Process Tracing.” In Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, Editors. Qualitative 
Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide. NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 21/2012    44 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. Editor. 2007. International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
-------. 2013. Transnational Dynamics of Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Chernoff, Fred. 2002. “Scientific Realism as a Meta-Theory of International Relations.” 
International Studies Quarterly 46/2: 189–207. 
Collier, David. 2011. “Understanding Process Tracing.” PS: Political Science and Politics 44/4: 
823–30. 
Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan. 1930. “The Adventure of the Blanched Soldier.” In Doyle, The Case-
Book of Sherlock Holmes. (Published in The Complete Sherlock Holmes Vol. 2. New 
York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003, pp. 528–29). 
Earman, John. 1992. Bayes or Bust: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Elster, Jon. 1998. “A Plea for Mechanisms.” In Peter Hedstroem and Richard Swedberg, Editors, 
Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
George, Alexander L. 1979. “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, 
Focused Comparison.” In Paul Gordon Lauren, Editor, Diplomatic History: New 
Approaches. NY: Free Press. 
-------. 1993. Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: USIP 
Press Books. 
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gerring, John. 2007a. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
-------. 2007b. “Review Article: The Mechanismic Worldview – Thinking Inside the Box.” 
British Journal of Political Science 38/1: 161–79. 
Gusterson, Hugh. 2008. “Ethnographic Research.” In Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, Editors. 
Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide. NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Hall, Peter. 2012. “Symposium: Tracing the Progress of Process Tracing.” European Political 
Science 11/3. 
  Process Tracing: From Philosphical Roots to Best Practice    45 
 
Hansen, Lene. 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. London: 
Routledge. 
Hedstroem, Peter and Petri Ylikoski. 2010. “Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences.” Annual 
Review of Sociology 36: 49–67. 
Hellman, Geoffrey. 1997. “Bayes and Beyond.” Philosophy of Science 64/2: 191–221. 
Hobarth, Robin. 1972. Process Tracing in Clinical Judgment: An Analytical Approach. PhD 
Thesis. Chicago: University of Chicago.  
Hoffmann, Matthew. 2008. “Agent-Based Modeling.” In Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, 
Editors. Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide. NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Hopf, Ted. 2002. Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, 
Moscow, 1955 and 1999. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
-------. 2007. “The Limits of Interpreting Evidence.” In Richard Ned Lebow and Mark Lichbach, 
Editors. Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics and International Relations. NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
-------. 2012. Reconstructing the Cold War. NY: Oxford University Press. 
Johnson, James. 2006. “Consequences of Positivism: A Pragmatist Assessment.” Comparative 
Political Studies 39/2: 224–52. 
Katzenstein, Peter and Rudra Sil. 2010. Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in World 
Politics. NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Khong, Yuen Foong. 1992. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam 
Decisions of 1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
King, Gary, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Kuehn, David and Ingo Rohlfing. 2009. “Does It, Really? Measurement Error and Omitted 
Variables in Multi-Method Research.” Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the American 
Political Science Association Organized Section for Qualitative and Multi-Method 
Research 7/2: 18–22. 
Laitin, David. 1998. Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near 
Abroad. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Lakatos, Imre. 1970. “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs.” In 
Imre Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Editors. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 21/2012    46 
 
Lake, David. 2010/2011. “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist 
Explanations for the Iraq War.” International Security 35/3: 7–52. 
Layne, Christopher. 1994. “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.” International 
Security 19/2: 5–49. 
Lieberman, Evan. 2005. “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative 
Research.” American Political Science Review 99/3: 435–452. 
-------. 2009. Boundaries of Contagion: How Ethnic Politics Have Shaped Government 
Responses to AIDS. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Lustick, Ian. 1996. “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records 
and the Problem of Selection Bias.” American Political Science Review 90/3: 605–618. 
Mahoney, James. 2001. “Review – Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in 
Theory and Method.” Sociological Forum 16/3: 575–93. 
-------. 2008. “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology.” Theory and Society 29/4: 507–548. 
------ 2012. “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences.” Sociological Methods 
and Research Online First Edition (published 2 March): 1–28. 
Mayntz, Renate. 2004. “Mechanisms in the Analysis of Macro-Social Phenomena.” Philosophy 
of the Social Sciences 34/2: 237–59. 
Mitchell, Ron. 1994. “Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty 
Compliance.” International Organization 48/3: 425–458. 
Neumann, Iver. 2008. “Discourse Analysis.” In Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, Editors. 
Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide. NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Nome, Martin and Nils Weidmann. 2013. “Conflict Diffusion via Social Identities: 
Entrepreneurship and Adaptation.” In Jeffrey T. Checkel, Editor. Transnational 
Dynamics of Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Norkus, Zenonas. 2005. “Mechanisms as Miracle Makers? The Rise and Inconsistencies of the 
‘Mechanismic Approach’ in Social Science and History.” History and Theory 44/3: 348–
372.  
Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” American 
Political Science Review 94/2: 251-267. 
Pouliot, Vincent. 2007. “‘Sobjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology.” International 
Studies Quarterly 51/2: 359–384. 
-------. 2010. International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy. NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
  Process Tracing: From Philosphical Roots to Best Practice    47 
 
Price, Richard. 1997. The Chemical Weapons Taboo. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Putnam, Robert, with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti. 1993. Making Democracy Work: 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Risse, Thomas, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink. Editors. 1999. The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change. NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Roberts, Clayton. 1996. The Logic of Historical Explanation. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press. 
Salmon, Wesley. 1990. Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2003. The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and 
Rhetoric. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schultz, Kenneth. 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Symposium. 2007. “Symposium: Multi-Method Work - Dispatches from the Front Lines.” 
Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association 
Organized Section on Qualitative Methods 5/1: 9–27. 
Tannenwald, Nina. 2007. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear 
Weapons since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. “Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical 
Reflection on Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work.” American Political Science 
Review 90/2: 389–397. 
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
Waldner, David. 2011. “Process Tracing, Its Promise, and Its Problems.” Paper presented at the 
Research Group on Qualitative and Multi-Method Analysis, Syracuse University, 
Syracuse, NY (June). 
-------. ND. “Process Tracing and Causal Mechanisms.” In H. Kincaid, Editor, Oxford Handbook 
of the Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (forthcoming). 
Wendt, Alexander. 1987. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” 
International Organization 41/3: 335–70. 
-------. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wight, Colin. 2002. “Philosophy of Science and International Relations.” In Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse, Beth Simmons, Editors. Handbook of International Relations. London: 
Sage Publications. 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 21/2012    48 
 
-------. 2006. Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2003. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
